With the advance of wireless communications technology, mobile I:ommunication.\ has become lIlure convenient than ever. Hnwcllcr, because of the openness of wireless comlllunication.l, how to prutect the p riva cy between communicating pa rties is becoming a very important issue. In thi.1 paper, we fucus on the .security of till! Glohal System for Mohile communication (GSM) networks, A secure communication architecture for the GSM ndwork is propused. In the pruposed architecture, we usc public-key cryptography for IHer authentic:ltioll and stream cipher fur message encryption and decryptioll. An authentication protocol and a key gcncnltion method arc presented in conjunction with the propo.sed 'Irchitcctllt·C, Cryptanalysis and operatiollal analysis . Ihnw that the authentication protocol h .WClIfC and efficient. Simulatioll results indicate that the key genuatilln method clIn alway.s produce key striu/;s elf evenly d is trib uted O's and I 's and with int1nitc period.
1,0 and Chen: Secure COllllllllniclItion Mcehanisms for GSM Networks block cipher and stream ci pher. Block cipher divides [he plaintext into blocks and encrypts each block independently. On the other hand, stream cipher encrypts the plaintext on a bit-by-bit (or bytc-by-byte) basis. In essence, GSM networks carry mostly voice, which is one type of contin uolls data. Since stream cip her is based on the eXclusive OR (XOR) operation, to encrypt/decrypt voice data bit-by-bit (or byte by-byte) using stream cipher is velY efficient. In general, stream cipher is much simpler and faster than block cipher
[1](20J. Therefore, stream cipher is a good choice [or message encryption/decryption for GSM networks.
The m,tior problem of stream cipher cryp tography is the difficulty of generating a long unpredictable bit pattern (keystream). In the one-time pad of stream cipher, a keystream is a sequence of randoIllly generatcd bits, and the probability of one bit to be I, independent of other bits, is equal to one half. An ideal kcystre<lm ill one-time pad is purely random and has infinite length. The keystreClm can not be generated by the rcceiving end, and can not be distributed to the receiving end either. The pseudorandom bit generator [20] has bccn widely llsed to construct the keystream. It generates a fi xed-length pscudorandom noise as the keystream. How to increase the length of the keystream while still maintallllng its randolllIless is important to the security of strdull cipher.
The X.509 Three-way Exchange (2l]
The X.509 three-way exchange, described ill ITU-T Recommendations X.50C), is a novel example of a public-key based authentication protocol. Key management of this protocol is seclJI'er than those of the protocols lIsing symmetric cryptography. However, the X,509 three-wa y exchange has some noticeable problems. Since the X . 50,) three way exchange performs encryption before signiug, the attacker Illay remove the signature from the ellClypted message and replace it with his own [21. furthermore, the X.509 three-way exchange docs not provide pe/feet j()f'IVlJrd secrecy so that the disclosure of the private key may compromise the session k ey.
Security Attacks
SecuIily mechanisms arc subject to different attacks.
Following is a discussion on some most noticeable attacks.
Replay Attack [lJ
An attacker can lise this attack to capture legitimate messages and retransmit them for illegal purpose, To defeat such an attack. non-repeated random /lumbers arc ollen used to ensure that all replayed messages will be detected. Time stamp, sequcnce number, and challenge-response arc three different types of nonccs. Each has its own limitations. As for time stamp, it is velY difficult alld expensive to maintain clock-synchronization among all parties at all time; as for sequcnce number, it requires that each party has to maintain state infonnatioll of other parties, which is impractical in an open system [8]; as for challenge-response, its security depends on the randomness of nonce, and it needs an extra message exchange to complete mutual authentication.
Guessing Attack III
Authentication usillg password is widely used by many security systems. However, password is vulnerable under the dictionary attack by which an attacker can guess the password successfully. Public-key clyptography provides a means for preventing the guessing attack .
Interleaving Attack [51
If an attacker could collect information frolll different executions of a secuIi ty protocol, he/she might be able to break the protocol. This is the so-called interleaving attack . 
Based on the paper

SECURI� COMMUNICATrON
MECHANISMS
The following notation is defined. 
3.t The Proposed ArchitectUl·c
The proposed architecture, shown in Fig. 2, still follows the three-tier structure as described in GSM standards, In this architec ture, the C3, C8 and C5 algorithms arc suggested to replace the 1\3, All and AS algorithms, respectively. The (allowing sections detail the C3, CR and C5 algorithms. Upon requesting service fro III a base station, a mobile llser has to prove his/Iter identity to the base station, After completing the service, he/she is charged for the service he received, Authentication is required not only when a connection is being established but also wilen the connection is being released. Since a mobile lIser is charged aftelwards, the base statioll should be able to prevent him froIll denying the service he received. This i mplies that nOIl-rcpudiation is needed. Furthermorc, the integrity of the servicc rcqucst message should be preserved. Although public-key cryptography is computationally intensive; however, it docs mcct thc authentication requirements of GSM networks.
According to the discussions aforcmcntioned, the design of C3 refcrs to the X,509 three-way exchange. In this design, certificates arc required .
Protocol Design
The C3 protocol has two phases: the connection phase and the release phase.
Connection Phase
The connection phase illcludes three steps. Fig . 3 depicts the connection phase of C3. For mobile user (MU) 111, his/her identity (Identitym), private key (K"riv.m), public kcy (Kp\lb,m) and certificate (Cert(lI1) are issued by certificate authority (CA), and are saved inside the Subscnber Interface Module (SIM) of his/her mobile device. For base station (BS) s, its identity (Identity,), private key (Kpriv.,), public key (KplIb,,) and certificate (Cert(s» arc also issued by CA.
Authentication is performed according to the following procedurc:
1m: mobile us�r 3: base station �: 11 random hUIllber generated by mootle u<.;�r m I � c It. ranuom num h�r generated by bnse station s I M: a random bit string gl!:ncraLcd hy ha�e :;t[ntion s iSVC_. REQ_PARMS � (Identity". Identity, s<!Vic:_id. k<yJength)
Fig. J. Connection Phase of the C3 Protocol
Step I: The MU requests service fro m the BS. Scrvice request paramcters (SVC_REQ]ARMS) include IdentitYrn, Identity" scrvicc_id (thc requested selv!ce identifier), and kCLlength (the length of the initial keystream). SVC_REQ_PARMS, along with nonce R) and MU's certificate (Ccrt(m»), arc sent to the BS, where R) is a challenge to the BS.
Step 2: The BS uses Cert(m) to verify MU's identity; generates a rando m bit string M of length "key Jength" and a random number R�, where R� is a challenge to the MU; signs SVC_REQ�PARMS, R), M, and R�, where R, is the response to the MU (The BS is authenticated); uses K p llb.1 I 1 to encrypt the signed message: sends the encrypted message, along with its cet1ificate (Cert(s», to the MU.
Step 3 KBytes which is much longer than the normal key Icngth ; e.g., 56 bits , 128 bits, and:) 12 bits.
Rclell�c Phase
The release phase, shown in fig. 4 . incl udes two steps.
{ljrlrHerCac"
REI. _REQ, Idclltlty., Jdt=nlilYm'
Fig. 4. Release Phase of the CJ Protocol
Step 1: The MU generates a random number R), where R) is a challenge to the BS; lIses Kpllb" to cncrypt R2 and R),
where R2 is the response to the BS (The MU is authenticated); sends the encrypted message, along with release request (REL _ REQ), Identity" and IdentitYm, to the BS.
Step 2: The BS uses K priv" to dccrypt the encrypted mcssage received; sends R), along with Identity"" Identity"
and billing information (I3ILL_INfO), to the MU,
where R] is the response to the MU (The BS is authenticated).
Comments
The security features of C3 arc highlighted as fo llows:
• In the first and second steps of the conllection phase, cet1ificates. Ccrt(m) and Ccrt(s), arc used to verify mobile user's and base station ' s identities, respectively.
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•
In the second and third steps of the connection phase, nonces, Rl and R2, arc lIsed to provide direct mutual authentication.
• In the first and second steps of thc release phase, mutual authentication is provided via Rz and RJ. Note that Rz is reused in the release phase with which the l1umber of message exchanges in the release phase is reduced by one.
• In the second step of the connection phase, the initial keystream (M) of the C8 algorithm, instead of a session key, is exchanged.
• In the second and third steps of the connection phase, signing is performed before encryption.
• In thc second and third steps of the conllectioll phase, the service J'cquest message is encrypted along with nonce. It is worthy of noti cing that the size of the service requcst mcssage is usually very small. Since the contents of the service request message arc limited and easy to predict, an attacker can find probabilistic encryption by guessing enough strings, To foil such an attack , it is practical to encrypt the service request message along with an unpredictable random llumber (llonce) [SJ.
• In the third step of the cOllllection phase, the service request message is signed by the mobile user; thus, non-repudiation is guaranteed.
•
The C] protocol can provide petji :C1 jimwmi secrecy since the initial keystream M is not repeated for every service request.
Key Generation (C8)
The C8 algorithm processes input data on a byte-by byte basi s. For an initial keystream of length k bytes, (Mo, M1, . .. , Mj, .. , , Mk_I), and an iuput message of length n byles, (mo, III I , '" , l11i' . . . , Ill,,_I), the keystream of length n byles, (Ko, K1, ... , Ki, . .. , KII.]), is generated according to the following procedure:
Step 1:
Step 2: Mj = Mj + cc;
Step J: Ki = Mj; N = (N + 1ll1) lIlod 256; i=i+ \;j=j+ I;cc�cc+ 1; Ifj = k then resetj to 0; If cc '" 256 then reset cc to 0;
where N, an eight-bit string, is used by the XOR operation to change Mo at the beginning or each cycle of M� cc is a
Humber added to M J U = 0 to k-\) so as to increase the randomncss ofM).
Note that the initial value of N can be any number between 0 and 255 (28 � 1). In Cll, we use the number 170 (l () 10 10 I ()2) as the default value of N.
Message EncryptionlDecryption(C5)
The C5 algorithm uses stream cipher [or encryption/decryption. III our design, the simplest stream cipher using only the XOR operation [201 is chosen.
ANALYS[S 4.1 Analysis (If C3
4_1.1 Cryptanalysis
In the second step of the connection phase, since the initial keystream M is signed by the AS, it is impossible for an attacker to obtain M. In the third step of the conIlection phase, M is signed by the MU� thus, it is free rrOlll revclation.
• Intcrleaving attack (2) base station attack
In the fi rst stcp uf tlB.; connection phase. if all attacker pretendee! as thc mobile uscr, he/she could !lot modify CA 's sign<1lmC on mobile 11ser's ide11lily
In the third step of the eOIlIlcctioll phase, since an attacker call llut sign R.'_ without mobile user's private key, he/she is llut able tu pretend as the mobile user. r n the fi ['sl step 0 f I he release phase, an altackcr can not obtain lIollce R2; therefore, it is impussible for him/her to pretend as t he mobile lIser.
Replay attack
The replay attack is not possible since the ch<lllenge response mechanism is used.
Gucssi ng attack
The guessing attack is not possible SIIlCC servlcc requcst p,ml1l1eters (SVC�REQ]ARMS) arc cnclypted alung with nOIlCe.
Man-in-the-middle attack
Both the mobile uscr anc! the base station can verify each other's idelltity by using each other's certificate. Also, since signing is perfor1lled before encryption in the C3 protocol, an aHacker can not rcmove Ihe signature from the encrypted message and replace it with its own. Therefore, the man-in-thc-lIliddle attack is prevented.
Operational Analysis
Number of message exchanges
Nonce R2 is used both in the connection phasc aud the release phase. By doing this, the Ilumber of message exchanges in the release phase is reduced to 2, which is olle less than the minimum nUIubcr of mcssage exchanges required for <I challenge-response based authentication protocol [91. Consequently, the total Ilumber of message exchanges of the CJ protocol is 5 instead of G. protocol performs one lIlore encryption than the X.509 three way exchange. For base stations, the total number of encryption/decryption of the X.509 three-way exchange is the same as that of the C3 protocol. The X.509 three-way exchange performs one mo re encryption operation than the C3 p rotocol . Consequently, base stations lIsing the C3
CrYlltogralihic operation
protocol are more efficient than those using the X.509 three way exchange.
For mobile users, the number of verification of the CJ protocol is one less than t hat of the X.509 three-way exchange. For base stations, the number of signing of the C3
protocol is one less than that of the X.509 three-way exchange. With rega rd to signing/verification, the C3
protocol is more efficient than the X.509 three-way exchange.
Analysis of C8
Security Analysis
The security of the C8 algorith m is evaluated by sim ulation. The simulator is coded in the C language and is mnlling on an Intel Pentium II-266MHz PC with (i4 ME RAM. Two metrics, randomness and period, arc selected for security evaluation. Randomness is defined to be the probability of being 0 or I. For a purely random keystream, the probability of one bit to be I, independent of other bits, is equal to one half. Period is defined to be the number of bytes in the repeated pattem of a keystream; for example, if a keystream of n bytes has no rcpeated pattern, then its period is equal to n.
In the following simulations, we consider four different types of initial keystreams (Ms). Type-l M is purely random, Legend: a/ b, where a is the probability of being 0, and b IS the probability of being 1 Table 2 (a), we notice that the probability of being 0 and that of being I arc the same, for Type-4
By examining
Type therefore, the C5 algorithm is very efficient. As to the security of C5, it is vel)' secure since the keystream (K) generated by ex has infinite period. Table 4 compares the architecture of today's GSM network with that of the proposed GSM network.
Comparison
The current architecture uses the challenge-rcsponse mechanism (A3) for user authentication and key exchange.
In GSM standards, symmetric cl)'ptography is recollllIlended for supporting this mechanislll. Symmetric cryptography is faster t han, but less secure than, public-key cryptography. If the A3 algorithm is revealed, the known-plaintext attack co ulc! be attempted elmi ng user authentication. The public� key-based C] protocol is more secure, but slower than the A3 algorithm.
The period of the keystream of the C5 algorithm can be very long, wh ich is it! sha rp contrast to the fixed-period keystream of the AS algorithm; the longe r the period of the keystream, the securer the stream cipheL Althou!�h it takes marc time to exchange a IOllger keystrealll (M) during connection establishlllcllt; however, stream eip her llsing only the XOR operation reduces the overheads during messages transfer. The C5 algoritlun can usc any publicly available stream cipher whereas the A5 algorithm is proprietary. 
CONCLUSrONS
The C5 algorithm is based an stream cipher. In our design, the simplest stream cipher using only the XOR
Summary
In this paper, we focus 011 lhe security of the Global 
Future Works
A very important part of the proposed architecture is the C5 algorithm. Although any publicly available stream cipher can be used; however, the effec tiveness and efficiency of the selected stream cipher significantly affect the performance and the secu rity of GSM networks. In the fu ture research, we will survey existing stream ciphers; [o r exam p le, the pseudorandom bit generator wit h bilateral step control [20) , and design a more effe ctive and emcient stream cipher fo r GS M networks.
